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The "Plain Touch" Corollary: A Natural
and Foreseeable Consequence of the Plain
View Doctrine
Larry E. Holtz*
Officer Cooper has a reasonable and articulable suspicion
that the individual he is presently confronting may be armed
and dangerous. Consequently, the officer immediately conducts
a pat-down frisk of the suspect. In the suspect's rear pants
pocket, Officer Cooper feels an object which, based on his street
experience and extensive training in the detection and recogni-
tion of narcotics, he recognizes to be numerous plastic baggies
containing a powdery substance. Officer Cooper knows the ob-
ject is not a weapon. He is certain, however, that the object is a
controlled dangerous substance.
Can Officer Cooper constitutionally reach into the suspect's
pocket and seize the object without a search warrant?
Hypothetical
I. Introduction
As an established principle of Fourth Amendment jurispru-
dence,1 searches and seizures conducted without a written warrant
are "per se unreasonable" 2 unless they fall within one of the recog-
nized exceptions to that amendment's written warrant requirement.3
* J.D., Temple University School of Law, 1988; B.A., Temple University, 1984. Assis-
tant County Prosecutor, Burlington County, New Jersey; Adjunct Professor of Law and Jus-
tice, Glassboro State College' Former Sergeant of Detectives, Atlantic City Police Depart-
ment, Atlantic City, New Jersey; New Jersey State certified police instructor.
I. The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.
2. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 701 (1983) (emphasis in original). Signifi-
cantly, only "[u]nreasonable searches or seizures conducted without any warrant at all are
condemned by the plain language of th[is] Amendment." Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573,
585 (1980).
3. See Thompson v. Louisiana, 469 U.S. 17, 20 (1984): Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S.
385, 390 (1978); United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 802, (1974); Schneckloth v. Bus-
tamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973); Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 34 (1970); Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
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This principle demonstrates a strong judicial preference 4 for a law
enforcement officer's acquisition of a search warrant prior to intrud-
ing into an individual's realm of privacy, and the requirement is not
to be dispensed with lightly. The judicial preference for a written
warrant is predicated on the proposition that the necessity, validity,
and reasonableness of a prospective search or seizure can best be
determined by a "neutral and detached magistrate" instead of a law
enforcement officer. 5 In this respect, the warrant procedure serves to
notify the citizen that an intrusion is legally authorized.6 The proce-
dure also interposes a "neutral magistrate between the citizen and
the law enforcement officer 'engaged in the often competitive enter-
prise of ferreting out crime.' "I
The Constitution does not, however, prohibit all warrantless
searches and seizures; the Constitution only "'forbids . . . unreason-
able searches and seizures.' " Consequently, over the course of time,
the United States Supreme Court has carved out of the Fourth
Amendment several carefully tailored exceptions to its warrant re-
quirement.9 The formally recognized exceptions include: (1) searches
conducted as an incident to a lawful arrest;"0 (2) probable-cause
4. See, e.g., Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 735 (1983) (searches and seizures conducted
"by way of a warrant is preferred").
5. See, e.g., Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319, 326 (1979) ("... a warrant
authorized by a neutral and detached judicial officer is 'a more reliable safeguard against
improper searches than the hurried judgment of a law enforcement officer' . . .") (quoting
United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 9 (1977)); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443,
450 (1971) (The point of the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement "is that prosecutors
and policemen simply cannot be asked to maintain the requisite neutrality with regard to their
own investigations-the 'competitive enterprise' that must rightly engage their single-minded
attention."); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948) ("When the right of privacy
must reasonably yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicial officer, not
by a policeman or Government enforcement agent.").
6. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 667 (1989); United
States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 9 (1977).
7. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 667 (quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14
(1948)). See also Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), in which the Court declared:
We are not dealing with formalities. The presence of a search warrant
serves a high function. Absent some grave emergency, the Fourth Amendment
has interposed a magistrate between the citizen and the police. This was done
not to shield criminals nor to make the home a safe haven for illegal activities. It
was done so that an objective mind might weigh the need to invade that privacy
in order to enforce the law.
Id. at 761.
8. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968) (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206,
222 (1960) (emphasis added)).
9. See, e.g., Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 735 ("Our cases hold that procedure by way
of a warrant is preferred, although in a wide range of diverse situations we have recognized
flexible, common-sense exceptions to this requirement.").
10. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218
(1973); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
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based searches conducted in the face of exigent circumstances;" (3)
searches of motor vehicles based on probable cause; 2 (4) searches
conducted for the purpose of cataloging a person's property through
established inventory procedures;' 3 (5) searches conducted pursuant
to a valid consent;'4 and (6) law enforcement activities that are not
considered searches within the meaning of the Constitution either
because the property in question is situated in the open fields,' 5 or
has been abandoned, 6 or the areas of concern are within the officer's
plain view.' 7
This article focuses upon the last stated exception to the written
warrant requirement, plain view, and whether, in the appropriate
case, the plain view doctrine may be invoked, not from an officer's
sense of sight, but from his or her sense of touch. To date, the
United States Supreme Court has not specifically adopted or directly
addressed the plain touch corollary to the plain view doctrine. As
this article demonstrates, "plain touch" is clearly a necessary and
appropriate corollary to the plain view doctrine.
II. The Plain View Doctrine
Although the plain view doctrine is often characterized as one
of the exceptions to the written warrant requirement, the Supreme
Court has indicated that "[i]f an article is already in plain view,
neither its observation nor its seizure would involve any invasion of
privacy."'" Moreover, it is well settled that "objects such as weapons
or contraband found in a public place may be seized by the police
without a warrant."' 9 Thus, government observation of property sit-
I1. United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951); United States v. Rubin, 474 F.2d 262
(3d Cir. 1973). Cf. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (exigency based on hot pursuit).
12. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132
(1925).
13. Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 (1987); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364
(1976).
14. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412
U.S. 218 (1973).
15. United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294 (1987); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170
(1984); Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924).
16. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988); Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217
(1960); Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924).
17. Horton v. California, 110 S. Ct. 2301 (1990); Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321
(1987); Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730 (1983); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443
(1971).
18. See Horton, 110 S. Ct. at 2306.
19. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 587 (1980). See also United States v. Place,
462 U.S. 696, 701-02 (1983) (recognizing the propriety of such a seizure "because, under
these circumstances, the risk of the item's disappearance or use for its intended purpose before
a warrant may be obtained outweighs the interest in possession").
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uated in a public place and in plain view involves no invasion of pri-
vacy, is "presumptively reasonable,"20 and is not considered a
"search"'" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. "Th[is]
principle is grounded on the recognition that when a police officer
has observed an object in 'plain view,' the owner's remaining inter-
ests in the object are merely those of possession and ownership
... "22 Consequently, if the plain view doctrine justifies an excep-
tion from the written warrant requirement, the exception must be
"addressed to the concerns that are implicated by seizures rather
than searches. 23
The seizure24 of a citizen's property by the government clearly
invades the owner's possessory interest, 5 and as a result, may only
occur when the government can constitutionally justify the invasion.
Interestingly, it has been observed that "in the vast majority of
cases, any evidence seized by the police will be in plain view, at least
at the moment of seizure."26 The critical inquiry, therefore, is under
what circumstances does plain view have constitutional significance
"rather than being simply the normal concomitant of any search,
legal or illegal." 27
As originally set forth by a plurality of the Supreme Court in
Coolidge v. New Hampshire,2 the piain view doctrine authorized
the government's seizure of a citizen's private possessions if three
requirements were met. First, the police officer had to "lawfully
make an 'initial intrusion' or otherwise properly be in a position from
which he [could] view a particular area."29 Second, the officer had to
20. Payton, 445 U.S. at 587.
21. "A search compromises the individual interest in privacy .... " Horton, 110 S. Ct.
at 2306, and takes place "when an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider
reasonable is infringed [by the government]." United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113
(1984).
22. Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S, 730, 739 (1983).
23. Horton v. California, 110 S. Ct. 2301, 2306 (1990). See also Brown, 460 U.S. at
738 n.4 ("It is important to distinguish 'plain view,' as used in Coolidge to justify seizure of an
object, from an officer's mere observation of an item left in plain view. Whereas the latter
generally involves no Fourth Amendment search ...the former generally does implicate the
Amendment's limitations upon seizures of personal property.") (emphasis in original; citations
omitted).
24. "[A] seizure deprives the individual of dominion over his or her person or property,"
Horton, 110 S. Ct. at 2306, and constitutes a "meaningful interference" with one's possessory
interest in that property. Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 469 (1985); Arizona v. Hicks,
480 U.S. 321, 325 (1987).
25. Macon, 472 U.S. at 469; Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 113.
26. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465 (1971) (emphasis in original).
27. Id. at 465-66.
28. 403 U.S. 443 (1971) (opinion of Stewart, J., joined by Douglas, Brennan, and Mar-
shall, JJ.).
29. Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 737 (1983); Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 465-68.
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"discover incriminating evidence 'inadvertently,' which is to say, he
[could] not 'know in advance the location of (certain) evidence and
intend to seize it,' relying on the plain view doctrine only as a pre-
text."30 Third, it had to be "immediately apparent" to the police that
the items they perceived were "evidence of a crime, contraband, or
otherwise subject to seizure."31
The first prong of the Coolidge formulation requires a legal in-
trusion that allows the police to "perceive32 and physically seize the
property in question. '33 If the plain view observation occurs in a
public place, there is no constitutional impediment to the viewing.34
More often, however, the plain view doctrine is invoked in conjunc-
tion with other law enforcement practices that bring police' into pri-
vate areas. For example, the plain view doctrine is fully applicable to
situations "in which the police have a warrant to search a given area
for specified objects, and in the course of the search come across
some other article of incriminating character. s"5 The doctrine is also
applicable when "the initial intrusion that brings the police within
plain view of such an article is supported, not by a warrant, but by
one of the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement
... ,,36 As the cases in this area indicate, the plain view doctrine
provides grounds for the seizure of an item when an officer's access
to the object has some prior justification under the Fourth Amend-
30. Brown, 460 U.S. at 737; Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 470.
31. Brown, 460 U.S. at 737; Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 466. This formulation, as originally
set forth by the plurality in Coolidge, was sharply criticized at the time the decision was
handed down. See Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 506 (Black, J., dissenting); id. at 516-21 (White, J.,
dissenting).
32. It is interesting to note the Court's use of the word "perceive," rather than "see,"
"observe," or any other synonym to describe the viewing of an object through the sense of
sight. The plain meaning of the term "perceive" connotes the ability to recognize or "identify
by means of the senses." THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1069
(unabridged ed. 1983). Thus, the Court's first comprehensive discussion of the plain view doc-
trine implicitly acknowledged the possibility of a future invocation of the doctrine by the use of
a sense other than sight.
33. Brown, 460 U.S. at 737 (emphasis added).
34. See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
35. Horton v. California, 110 S. Ct. 2301, 2307 (1990) (quoting Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465-66 (1971)). See also Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192
(1927).
36. Horton, 110 S. Ct. at 2037 (quoting Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 466). As Justice Stewart
explained in Coolidge:
[Tlhe police may inadvertently come across evidence while in "hot pursuit" of a
fleeing suspect . . . . And an object that comes into view during a search inci-
dent to arrest that is appropriately limited in scope under existing law may be
seized without a warrant. Finally, the "plain view" doctrine has been applied
where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but
nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object.
Id. (citations omitted).
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ment.37 The doctrine, therefore, supplements the prior justification as
long as the remaining requisites of the doctrine are satisfied. In light
of the doctrinal basis for the first prong, " '[p]lain view' is perhaps
better understood, . . . not as an independent 'exception' to the
Warrant Clause, but simply as an extension of whatever the prior
justification for an officer's 'access to an object' may be."38
The remaining two prongs of the original Coolidge formulation
demonstrate " 'that plain view alone is never enough to justify the
warrantless seizure of evidence . . . .' "9 The second prong had
originally required that the discovery of the incriminating evidence
be inadvertent; the police could not know that the evidence in ques-
tion would be where it was ultimately found and could not intend
beforehand to seize it. According to Justice Stewart, "where the dis-
covery is anticipated, where the police know in advance the location
of the evidence and intend to seize it, the [prior knowledge violates]
the express constitutional requirement of 'Warrants . . . particularly
describing . . . [the] things to be seized.' "40 Moreover, the inadver-
tence requirement eliminated the risk that an initially valid search
would turn into a " 'general' one.""
Justice Stevens found Justice Stewart's reasoning flawed in two
respects. In Horton v. California,2 Justice Stevens wrote for a seven
member majority and declared that
evenhanded law enforcement is best achieved by the application
of objective standards of conduct, rather than standards that de-
pend upon the subjective state of mind of the officer. The fact
that an officer is interested in an item of evidence and fully ex-
pects to find it in the course of a search should not invalidate its
seizure if the search is confined in area and duration by the
terms of a warrant or a valid exception to the warrant
requirement.
43
37. Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 738 (1983). See also Horton, 110 S. Ct. at 2308,
noting that
[it is] an essential predicate to any valid warrantless seizure of incriminating
evidence that the officer did not violate the Fourth Amendment in arriving at the
place from which the evidence could be plainly viewed. Moreover, not only must
the officer be lawfully located in a place from which the object can be plainly
seen, but he or she must also have a lawful right of access to the object itself.
Id.
38. Brown, 460 U.S. at 738-39.
39. Horton, 110 S. Ct. at 2307 (quoting Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 468) (emphasis in
original).
40. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 470-71 (1971).
41. Id. at 469-70.
42. 110 S. Ct. 2301 (1990).
43. Id. at 2308-09. The Court further observed that "[i]f an officer has knowledge ap-
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In addition, the Horton Court rejected the suggestion that the inad-
vertence prong of the plain view doctrine is necessary to prevent the
police from conducting general searches, or from converting specific
warrants into general warrants. "[T]hat interest," stated Justice Ste-
vens, "is already served by the requirements that no warrant issue
unless it 'particularly describ[es] the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized,"" .. .and that a warrantless search
be circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its initiation. 4 3
Strict adherence to these requirements, therefore, "serves the inter-
ests in limiting the area and duration of the search that the inadver-
tence requirement inadequately protects."4 As a result, the Court
concluded that once those requirements have been met and the of-
ficer has a lawful right of access, then "no additional Fourth
Amendment interest is furthered by requiring that the discovery of
evidence be inadvertent. 47
The final prong of the original Coolidge formulation had re-
quired that it be "immediately apparent" to the police that the items
they perceive are evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise sub-
ject to official seizure.48 This prong has also received subsequent
modification, or at least clarification. In Texas v. Brown, 9 the Court
explained that the Coolidge plurality's term "immediately apparent"
perhaps connoted too high a degree of certainty as to the incrimina-
tory character of evidence that is necessary for an application of the
plain view doctrine.50 The Brown Court therefore held that the con-
stitutional justification for the seizure of an item found in plain view
is "'probable cause to associate the property with criminal activ-
ity.' 51 Probable cause is
proaching certainty that the item will be found, we see no reason why he or she would deliber-
ately omit a particular description of the item to be seized from the application for a search
warrant." Id.
44. Id. See also Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84 (1987); Steele v. United States,
267 U.S. 498, 503 (1925).
45. Horton v. California, 110 S. Ct. 2301, 2309 (1990). See also Maryland v. Buie, 110
S. Ct. 1093, 1098-99 (1990); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393 (1978).
46. Horton, 110 S. Ct. at 2309.
47. Id. at 2309-10. See also Note, "Plain View"-Anything But Plain: Coolidge Divides
the Lower Courts, 7 LOYOLA L.A. L. REV. 489 (1974).
48. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 466 (1971).
49. 460 U.S. 730 (1983).
50. Id. at 741.
51. Id. at 741-42 (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 587 (1980)). See also
Colorado v. Bannister, 449 U.S. I, 3-4 (1980), in which, pre-Brown, the Court used a "proba-
ble-cause-to-associate" standard rather than one requiring the incriminating character of the
evidence to be immediately apparent. Interestingly, in Bannister, the Court permitted the war-
rantless seizure of the incriminating evidence, noting that "it would be especially unreasonable
to require a detour to a magistrate before the unanticipated evidence could be lawfully seized."
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a flexible, common-sense standard. It merely requires that the
facts available to the officer would "warrant a man of reasona-
ble caution in the belief" 5 . . . that certain items may be con-
traband or stolen property or useful as evidence of a crime; it
does not demand any showing that such a belief be correct or
more likely true than false. A "practical, nontechnical"
probability that incriminating evidence is involved is all that is
required .3
Synthesis of the foregoing principles indicates that today's law
enforcement officer may validly invoke the plain view doctrine when
two requirements are met. First, the officer must be lawfully in the
viewing area; that is to say, he or she cannot violate the Fourth
Amendment in arriving at the place from which the evidence could
be plainly perceived. 54 The second prong requires that the officer's
perception of the particular piece of property provide him or her
with probable cause to believe that the property constitutes evidence
of crime, contraband, or is otherwise subject to official seizure.55 The
Id. at 3 n.2. Accord Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987), in which the Court rejected the
state's contention that the plain view doctrine could be constitutionally invoked when the po-
lice have a "reasonable suspicion" that the property in question could be associated with crimi-
nal activity. Instead, the Court held that "probable cause" is required.
To say otherwise would be to cut the "plain view" doctrine loose from its theo-
retical and practical moorings. The theory of that doctrine consists of extending
to nonpublic places such as the home, where searches and seizures without a
warrant are presumptively unreasonable, the police's longstanding authority to
make warrantless seizures in public places of such objects as weapons and con-
traband . . . .And the practical justification for that extension is the desirabil-
ity of sparing police, whose viewing of the object in the course of a lawful search
is as legitimate as it would have been in a public place, the inconvenience and
the risk-to themselves or to preservation of the evidence-of going to obtain a
warrant . . . .Dispensing with the need for a warrant is worlds apart from per-
mitting a lesser standard of cause for the seizure that a warrant would require,
i.e., the standard of probable cause.
Id. at 327-28 (emphasis in original).
52. Brown, 460 U.S. at 742 (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162
(1925)).
53. Id. (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 388 U.S. 160, 176 (1949)). See also United
States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (1981), in which the Court explained that the process of devel-
oping probable cause
does not deal with hard certainties, but with probabilities. Long before the law
of probabilities was articulated as such, practical people formulated certain com-
mon-sense conclusions about human behavior; jurors as factfinders are permitted
to do the same-and so are law enforcement officers . . . . [Elvidence thus col-
lected must be seen and weighed not in terms of library analysis by scholars, but
as understood by those versed in the field of law enforcement.
Id. at 418.
54. See supra text accompanying notes 29, 33-37.
55. See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text. See also Payton v. New York, 445
U.S. 573, 587 (1980) ("The seizure of property in plain view involves no invasion of privacy
and is presumptively reasonable, assuming that there is probable cause to associate the prop-
erty with criminal activity."); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 701-02 (1983).
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critical question then becomes whether it makes a difference if the
officer's development of probable cause stems from his or her sense
of sight or sense of touch, and whether the Constitution requires tac-
tilely-developed probable cause to be treated differently from proba-
ble cause garnered from the sense of sight.
11. The Plain Touch Corollary
A. A Proposed Formulation
The plain touch corollary to the plain view doctrine should not
be characterized as a "new" exception to the written warrant re-
quirement, for it is not. As its name indicates, it is merely a corol-
lary to a doctrine which over the years has become an appropriate,
familiar, and useful tool in the law enforcement trade. The formula-
tion set forth below merely continues the familiar standards while
furnishing a bright-line rule of law enforcement procedure. It is
predicated on the proposition that probable cause is probable cause,
and it matters not whether its development flows from an officer's
sense of sight, touch, or some other sense. Practically speaking, any
attempt to differentiate or prioritize the Fourth Amendment's proba-
ble cause standard by reference to the human sense from which it
flows could only lead to confusing and absurd results.
Before a law enforcement officer may validly invoke the "plain
touch corollary" to the plain view doctrine, it is submitted that the
government bears the burden of establishing three requirements. 6
56. These requirements are set forth by reference to the United States Supreme Court's
direction in Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765 (1983):
In fashioning a standard, we must be mindful of three Fourth Amendment prin-
ciples. First, the standard should be workable for application by rank-and-file,
trained police officers . . . . Second, it should be reasonable . . . . Third, the
standard should be objective, not dependent on the belief of individual police
officers.
Id. at 772-73. As Professor LaFave has stated, constitutional protection "can only be realized
if the police are acting under a set of rules that, in most instances, makes it possible to reach a
correct determination beforehand as to whether an invasion of privacy is justified in the inter-
est of law enforcement." LaFave, "Case-By-Case Adjudication" Versus "Standardized Proce-
dures": The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 S, CT. REV. 127, 1942. In this respect,
Fourth Amendment doctrine, given force and effect by the exclusionary rule, is
primarily intended to regulate the police in their day-to-day activities and thus
ought to be expressed in terms that are readily applicable by the police in the
context of the law enforcement activities in which they are necessarily engaged.
A highly sophisticated set of rules, qualified by all sorts of ifs, ands, and buts
and requiring the drawing of subtle nuances and hairline distinctions, may be
the sort of heady stuff upon which the facile minds of lawyers and judges eagerly
feed, but they may be literally impossible of application by the officer in the
field.
Id. at 141.
The plain touch formulation hereinafter set forth is offered as a workable standard that
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First, the officer must be lawfully in the touching area, which is to
say that the officer may not violate the Fourth Amendment by arriv-
ing at the place from which the evidence may be tactilely per-
ceived. 57 Second, the officer must have some independent constitu-
tional justification for placing his or her hands on the property or
person in question. This requirement, though not unrelated to the
mandate that the officer lawfully be in the perceiving area, should
receive separate scrutiny probing the independent and distinct con-
stitutional justification for touching the person or the evidentiary
item. Thus, the second prong of the plain touch corollary requires
the officer's hands to be lawfully on the touching area.58 Finally,
upon touching the area in question, the officer must, through the
process of tactile recognition, garner probable cause to believe the
object that he or she is tactilely perceiving constitutes evidence of
crime, contraband, or is otherwise subject to official seizure. 59 Addi-
tionally, the development of probable cause should be reasonably
contemporaneous with the initial touching to avoid the danger of an
inoffensive touch graduating into a governmental massage, which
"by virtue of its intolerable intensity and scope,""0 may violate the
limits the risk of intrusion on a citizen's legitimate privacy interests, while at the same time
striking an appropriate balance with the competing governmental interests in effective law
enforcement and the substantial present-day concerns of the senseless havoc plaguing our Na-
tion by the sale and distribution of dangerous and illegal drugs. Moreover, it represents a
"familiar standard" which is "essential to guide police officers, who have only limited time and
expertise to reflect on and balance the social and individual interests involved in the specific
circumstances they confront." Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 213-14 (1979).
57. See supra text accompanying notes 29, 32-37.
58. The Supreme Court has implied that analogous "investigative touchings" could con-
stitute a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. For example, in Arizona v.
Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987), the Court determined that a search occurred when an officer
moved a piece of stereo equipment a few inches in order to inspect its serial number. The court
reasoned that "the distinction between looking at a suspicious object in plain view and moving
it even a few inches is much more than trivial for purposes of the Fourth Amendment . . . . A
search is a search, even if it happens to disclose nothing but the bottom of a turntable." Id. at
325. See also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I, 16 (1968) ("it is nothing less than sheer torture of
the English language to suggest that a careful exploration of the outer surfaces of a person's
clothing all over his or her body in an attempt to find weapons is not a 'search' "); United
States v. Most, 876 F.2d 191, 195 (D.C. Cir. 1989) ("plain touch" will apply only when an
officer is "legally authorized to touch the container in the first place;" the "initial touching of
Most's bag was itself a warrantless search which required its own justification"); United States
v. Pace, 709 F.Supp. 948, 956-57 (C.D. Cal. 1989) (before the "plain touch" exception may be
invoked, the officer must be "legally authorized to touch and pat down" the suspect); People v.
Carlson, 187 Cal. App. 3d 6, 17, 233 Cal. Rptr. 236, 241 (1986) (secret service agent's gen-
eral exploratory light touching of the waists of the people gathered to see presidential candi-
date Gary Hart triggered Fourth Amendment interests).
59. See supra text accompanying notes 51-53.
60. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 18. See also United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 124
(1984) ("[A] seizure lawful at its inception can nevertheless violate the Fourth Amendment
because its manner of execution unreasonably infringes possessory interests protected by the
Fourth Amendment's prohibition on 'unreasonable seizures.' ").
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Fourth Amendment. In this respect, "[tihe scope of the [touching]
must be 'strictly tied to and justified by' the circumstances which
rendered its initiation permissible."61
When each of the three prongs of the plain touch corollary is
satisfied, the warrantless seizure of the item in question is constitu-
tionally permitted.6 In fact, in those cases in which each of the three
61. Terry, 392 U.S. at 19 (quoting Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 310 (1967) (For-
tas, J., concurring)). See also Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367-68 (1964).
62. See Horton v. California, 110 S. Ct. 2301, 2310 (1990) ("the seizure of an object in
plain view does not involve an intrusion on privacy"); Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 326
(1987) (" 'It is well established that under certain circumstances the police may seize evidence
in plain view without a warrant.' ") (citation omitted; emphasis in original); Texas v. Brown,
460 U.S. 730, 739 (1983) ("our decisions have come to reflect the rule that if, while lawfully
engaged in an activity in a particular place, police officers perceive a suspicious object, they
may seize it immediately") (emphasis added); Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. I, 5-6
(1982) (the plain view doctrine "permits a law enforcement officer to seize what clearly is
incriminating evidence or contraband when it is discovered in a place where the officer has a
right to be"); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 587 (1980); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S.
40, 79 (1968) (so long as the frisk is lawful, "the State is of course entitled to the use of any
other contraband that appears") (Harlan, J., concurring).
According to Hicks, supra, allowing the immediate seizure of an evidentiary item discov-
ered in plain view demonstrates the "desirability of sparing police, whose viewing of the object
in the course of a lawful search is as legitimate as it would have been in a public place, the
inconvenience and the risk-to themselves or to preservation of the evidence-of going to ob-
tain a warrant." Id. at 327.
See also Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420 (1981), in which Justice Powell appropri-
ately observed:
Confronted with a cigar box or a Dixie cup in the course of a probable cause
search of an automobile for narcotics, the conscientious policeman would be re-
quired to take the object to a magistrate, fill out the appropriate forms, await
the decision, and finally obtain the warrant. Suspects or vehicles normally will be
detained while the warrant is sought. This process may take hours, removing the
officer from his normal police duties. Expenditure of such time and effort, drawn
from the public's limited resources for detecting or preventing crimes, is justified
when it protects an individual's reasonable privacy interests. In my view, the
plurality's requirement cannot be so justified. The aggregate burden of procuring
warrants whenever an officer has probable cause to search the most trivial
container may be heavy and will not be compensated by the advancement of
important Fourth Amendment values.
Id. at 433-34 (Powell, J., concurring).
The inordinate expenditure of the government's limited resources in this context is only
one side of the coin. On the other side is the extended intrusion on the individual's freedom by
virtue of a detention that has been prolonged solely for the purpose of securing a search war-
rant. In order to lend efficacy to the Supreme Court's declaration that courts "must balance
the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against
the importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion," United States v.
Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983), an immediate seizure of an evidentiary item, tactilely per-
ceived to be a weapon, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure, by an officer lawfully in
and on the touching area is perhaps the least intrusive of the two available alternatives. More-
over, since a seizure of property may be justified on less than probable cause "[w]hen the
nature and extent of the detention are minimally intrusive of the individual's Fourth Amend-
ment interests," id. at 703, it clearly follows that an evidentiary item tactilely perceived
through some type of container may be seized (that is, removed from the container) without a
warrant when probable cause does exist. See also Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654
(1979) ("the permissibility of a particular law enforcement practice is judged by balancing its
intrusion on . . .Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate governmen-
95 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW SPRING 1991
requirements is clearly satisfied, an officer would be derelict in his or
her official duty if he or she were to turn a blind hand to the incrimi-
nating evidence and allow the subject to retain possession of it.63
Moreover, as the Supreme Court has observed, "requiring police to
obtain a warrant once they have obtained a first-hand perception of
contraband, stolen property, or incriminating evidence generally
would be a 'needless inconvenience,' . . . that might involve danger
to the police and public.""
B. Testing the Formulation
Although the United States Supreme Court has not directly ad-
dressed the plain touch corollary, it has nonetheless opened the door
for its adoption in several respects. First, the Court has recognized
that probable cause may be established from one of the human
senses other than sight.6" This became particularly evident in Texas
v. Brown,66 in which the Court spoke of an officer being lawfully in
tal interests").
63. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Stainbrook, 324 Pa. Super. 410, 415, 471 A.2d 1223,
1225 (1984) (holding that it would have "been a dereliction of duty for [the officer] 'to ignore
the obvious aroma of an illegal drug which he was trained to identify' "); cf. Michigan v.
Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1050 (1983) (if an officer finds contraband instead of a weapon during
the course of a legitimate Terry-frisk of the passenger compartment of an automobile, "he
clearly cannot be required to ignore the contraband, and the Fourth Amendment does not
require its suppression in such circumstances").
64. Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 739 (1983) (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire,
403 U.S. 443, 468 (1971)) (emphasis added). Although the "needless inconvenience," referred
to here speaks of inconvenience to the police, see Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 443; Place, 462 U.S. at
701-02 ("under these circumstances, the risk of the item's 'disappearance or use for its in-
tended purposes before a warrant may be obtained outweighs the interest in possession"), over
nine years of personal experience has revealed to this author that it is the citizen who is truly
inconvenienced. In the typical case, the police officer is on duty anyway and it truly does not
matter to most officers if they spend the next several hours seeking a search warrant or patrol-
ling the community. The true outrage flows from the citizen who is detained for the several
hours that it takes to procure a search warrant, and from the community who questions why
there is never an officer in the vicinity when one is needed. See also Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S.
491, 500 (1983) ("investigative methods employed should be the least intrusive means reason-
ably available to verify or dispel the officer's suspicion in a short period of time").
In the typical plain view case, Professor LaFave notes that so long as "the viewing is itself
lawful, then if there is probable cause for seizure of what is seen[,] that seizure need not be
made pursuant to a warrant merely because the object is inside a container." W. LAFAVE.
SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 7.2(d), at 67 (2d ed.
1987). Significantly, LaFave states: "Similarly, assuming lawful physical contact with the
container, this 'plain touch' may reveal the contents so unquestionably that here as well no
warrant requirement exists merely because there is a container between the officer and the
seizable object." Id.
65. See Horton v. California, 110 S. Ct. 2302, 2308 n.7 (1990) (" 'Incontrovertible testi-
mony of the senses that an incriminating object is on premises belonging to a criminal suspect
may establish the fullest possible measure of probable cause.' ") (quoting Coolidge, 403 U.S.
at 468).
66. 460 U.S. 730 (1983).
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the "perceiving" area rather than lawfully in the "viewing" or "see-
ing" area. 7
Johnson v. United States68 is illustrative. In Johnson, a Seattle
police detective and four federal narcotics agents, each experienced
in narcotic work, gathered at the outside of defendant's hotel room.
From their vantage point outside the room, the officers detected the
distinctive and, to them, the unmistakable odor of burning opium. 69
Defendant contended to the Court that odors alone are insufficient
evidence to constitute probable cause for a search. 70 Rejecting this
contention, the Court opined that "[i]f the presence of odors is testi-
fied to before a magistrate and he finds the affiant qualified to know
the odor, and it is one sufficiently distinctive to identify a forbidden
substance, this Court has never held such a basis insufficient to jus-
tify issuance of a search warrant. ' 71 Referring to a trained officer's
olfactory powers and his or her seasoned ability to recognize distinc-
tive narcotic odors, the Court declared, "Indeed it might very well be
found to be evidence of the most persuasive character. 71 2 Since
Johnson, a substantial majority of the courts across the country that
have addressed the issue have routinely recognized a "plain smell"
corollary to the plain view doctrine. 7a
67. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. See also Brown, 460 U.S. at 739 ("if,
while lawfully engaged in an activity in a particular place, police officers perceive a suspicious
object, they may seize it immediately") (emphasis added). See id. at 737 ("The question
whether property in plain view may be seized therefore must turn on the legality of the intru-
sion that enables [police] to perceive . . . the property in question.") (emphasis added); id. at
738 n.4 (with respect to when an officer's access to an object has some prior justification under
the Fourth Amendment, "police may perceive an object while executing a search warrant, or
they may come across an item while acting pursuant to some exception to the Warrant
Clause") (emphasis added).
68. 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
69. Id. at 12.
70. Id. at 13.
71. Id. See also United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1965).
72. Johnson, 333 U.S. at 13. See also United States v. Johns, 469 U.S. 478 (1985)
(distinct odor of marijuana emanating from the back of two pickup trucks provided officers
with probable cause to believe the vehicles contained contraband).
73. See e.g., United States v. Norman, 701 F.2d 295, 297 (4th Cir. 1983) (in upholding
the warrantless search of bales of marijuana located on a ship due to the strong odor emanat-
ing from the bales, the court reasoned that "for an object to be in plain view, it must only be
'obvious to the senses' . . . . [T]o be obvious to the senses, contraband need only reveal itself
in a characteristic way to one of the senses"); United States v. Lueck, 678 F.2d 895, 903 (11 th
Cir. 1982) (contents of packages were "inferable" within the meaning of the Sanders footnote
when, inter alia, the "packages reeked of marijuana"); United States v. Haley, 669 F.2d 201,
203 (4th Cir. 1982) ("characteristic which brings the contents into plain view is the odor given
off by those contents"); United States v. Haynie, 637 F.2d 227, 233 (4th Cir. 1980) (holding
that the odor of marijuana emanating from the back of defendant's car "established probable
cause for the search of the trunk as well as placing the search within the plain view doctrine,"
and declaring that "probable cause may be supported by the detection of distinctive odors, as
well as by sight"); United States v. Pagan, 395 F. Supp. 1052, 1061 (D.P.R. 1975), a ffd 537
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The seminal case of Terry v. Ohio74 is perhaps the most logical
forerunner of the plain touch corollary. Terry stands for the proposi-
tion that
F.2d 554 (1st Cir. 1976) (plain view "doctrine has been expanded to cover that evidence that
can be perceived by the sense of smell"); United States v. Turbyfill, 373 F. Supp. 1372, 1375
(W.D. Mo. 1974), affd 525 F.2d 87 (8th Cir. 1975) ("the plain view doctrine has been ex-
panded somewhat .. .to include a 'fresh smell' doctrine"); United States v. Sifuentes, 504
F.2d 845, 848 (4th Cir. 1974) (observation of boxes in truck combined with "strong odor of
marijuana" brought the contraband into the plain view of the officers; it was "obvious to the
senses"); People v. Gale, 9 Cal. 3d 788, 793-94, 511 P.2d 1204, 108 Cal. Rptr. 852 (1973)
(odor of fresh marijuana providing probable cause for the arrest of defendant); State v.
Guerra, 93 N.J. 146, 150-51, 459 A.2d 1159, 1161-62 (1983) (strong odor of raw, unburned
marijuana provides the necessary justification to conduct a warrantless search of a lawfully
stopped automobile; "[riegardless of the visibility of their contents, the size of the packages
and the odor of marijuana that they emitted clearly suggested that they contained contra-
band") (citing the Sander's footnote); State v. Schubert, 235 N.J. Super. 212, 225, 561 A.2d
1186, 1192 (App. Div. 1989) (strong odor of gasoline emanating from arson suspect's car
provided probable cause to search the vehicle under the automobile exception); State v.
Nichol, 55 Or. App. 162, 166, 637 P.2d 625, 627 (1981) ("odor from the paper bag [found in
defendant's car] revealed its contents as fully as if it had been made of clear, not opaque,
material"); Commonwealth v. Stainbrook, 342 Pa. Super. 410, 415, 471 A.2d 1223, 1225
(1984) (holding that it would have "been a dereliction of duty for [the officer] to ignore the
obvious aroma of an illegal drug which he was trained to identify"); State v. Washington, 134
Wis. 2d 108, 396 N.W. 2d 156, 161-62 (1986) ("Evidence in plain view is not restricted to
items which can only be seen, but rather includes the realization of items or events to all of the
human senses, smell, sight, touch, hearing and taste.").
Of course, invocation of the "plain smell" corollary requires that the officer first be law-
fully in the olfactory area, and second, that the odor provide him or her with probable cause to
associate the odor with criminal activity. See United States v. Curran, 498 F.2d 30, 33 (9th
Cir. 1974) ("before the officer could rely upon his smelling marijuana as probable cause, he
would have to justify his presence at the place"); Lara v. State, 497 So. 2d 1311 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1986) (officers may use sense of smell from a place where officer had a right to be);
Commonwealth v. Stoner, 236 Pa. Super. 161, 165, 344 A.2d 633, 635 (1975) (analogizing a
"plain smell" concept with that of plain view and holding that when an officer is justified in
being where he is, his detection of the odor of marijuana is sufficient to establish probable
cause). See also State v. Gauldin, 44 N.C. App. 19, 22, 259 S.E.2d 779, 781 (1979) (since
"the sense of smell, unlike eyesight, does not always pinpoint what is being sensed and where
the material is located," proof should be offered as to what exactly was smelled and the loca-
tion of the odor). See also W. LAFAVE, supra note 64, at 67 (in the plain smell case, "no
warrant is required provided, of course, that the incriminating smell can be attributed to the
[suspect] container"). According to LaFave, "plain smell" may be considered
a logical extension of the [Sanders] footnote 13 principle; if one has an insuffi-
cient expectation of privacy to invoke the warrant requirement by using contain-
ers whose contents "can be inferred from their outward appearance," then the
same might well be said of the use of containers which fail to confine incriminat-
ing odors.
Id. at 67-68. See infra text accompanying notes 83 and 84. But see United States v. Dien, 609
F.2d 1038, 1045 (2d Cir. 1979), aff'd on rehearing, 615 F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1980) (odor of
marijuana did not validate warrantless search; defendant maintained an expectation of privacy
by "placing the marijuana inside a plain cardboard box [and] sealing it").
With respect to other senses, courts have also recognized a "plain hearing" exception for
those circumstances in which an officer overhears statements without the benefit of a listening
device while the officer is stationed at a lawful vantage point. Any statements so overheard are
then admissible at trial. See. e.g., United States v. Jackson, 588 F.2d 1046, 1051-52, (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941 (1979); United States v. Fisch, 474 F.2d 1071, 1076-78 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 921 (1973).
74. 392 U.S. I (1968).
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where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him
reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal
activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is deal-
ing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the course
of investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a police
[officer] and makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in
the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable
fear for his own or others' safety, he is entitled for the protection
of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited
search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to
discover weapons which might be used to assault him.
Such a search is a reasonable search under the Fourth
Amendment, and any weapons seized may properly be intro-
duced in evidence against the person from whom they were
taken.75
Terry and his codefendant were stopped by Cleveland Police
Detective McFadden because McFadden believed that the two were
"casing a job, a stick-up" of a retail establishment located on Huron
Road in Cleveland. Based on what the Court later described as a
reasonable belief that Terry was "armed and presently dangerous,"76
McFadden conducted a pat down of Terry's outer clothing. In the
left breast pocket of Terry's overcoat Officer McFadden felt a pis-
tol. 7 At that point, McFadden conducted a warrantless search, re-
moving Terry's overcoat completely, and then removing a .38 caliber
revolver from the coat pocket. Significantly, it was only through Mc-
Fadden's tactile recognition and his training and experience7" that he
was able to recognize that the object that he was touching was in
fact a handgun.
Concluding that the revolver seized from Terry in the warrant-
less search was properly admitted in evidence against him, the Court
observed that "Officer McFadden patted down the outer clothing of
[Terry] . . . .He did not place his hands in [his] pockets or under
the outer surface of [Terry's] garments until he had felt [a]
weapon[], and then he merely reached for and removed the gun
"79
Under the Terry-frisk set of circumstances, the officer's reason-
75. Id. at 30.
76. Id. at 24.
77. Id. at 7.
78. McFadden testified that he had been a police officer for 39 years and a detective for
35 of those years. He also stated that he had been continuously assigned for thirty years to
patrol the particular area where Terry was observed for shoplifters and pickpockets. Id. at 5.
79. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I, 29-30 (1968) (emphasis added).
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able and articulable fear for his safety or the safety of others vali-
dates the warrantless touching or frisking of a suspect's outer cloth-
ing. Thereafter, the tactile recognition of a weapon perceived during
the course of the lawful pat down validates the seizure of the sus-
pected weapon so long as the officer's training and experience lead
him reasonably to conclude that the object is a weapon. The "plain
touch," therefore, elevates the officer's reasonable suspicion that the
suspect might be armed, to probable cause to believe that the suspect
is concealing a weapon."
Considering Terry v. Ohio to be a reasonable forecast of the
plain touch corollary is not a novel idea. Professor LaFave has also
written:
Assuming the object discovered in the pat-down does not feel
like a weapon, this only means that a further search may not be
80. See also Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983), which extends the protective
Terry-frisk from the person of the detained individual to
the passenger compartment of an automobile, limited to those areas in which a
weapon may be placed or hidden, [so long as] the officer possesses a reasonable
belief based on "specific and articulable facts which, taken together with the
rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant" the officer in believing
that the suspect is dangerous and the suspect may gain immediate control of
weapons.
Id. at 1049 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21). Then, "[i]f, while conducting a legitimate Terry
search of the interior of the automobile, the officer [discovers] contraband other than weapons,
he clearly cannot be required to ignore the contraband, and the Fourth Amendment does not
require its suppression in such circumstances." Long, 463 U.S. at 1050 (emphasis added).
For a "staircase" and "landing" discussion of an officer's ascent from reasonable suspicion
to probable cause, see generally L. HOLTZ. NEW JERSEY CONTEMPORARY CRIMINAL PROCE-
DURE § 1.1 (Gould Pub. 1991 ed.).
Cf. Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968), a companion case decided along with Terry,
in which the Court held invalid the seizure of several glassine envelopes of heroin seized from
Sibron during an alleged pat-down frisk. According to the Court, the officer, having no reason
whatsoever to fear for his safety, approached Sibron after watching him converse with several
known drug dealers. The officer stated, "You know what I'm after." According to the officer,
Sibron then " 'mumbled something and reached into his pocket.' Simultaneously, [the officer]
thrust his hand into the same pocket, discovering [the] glassine envelopes [of heroin]." Id. at
45. In response to this set of circumstances, the Court stated:
The search for weapons approved in Terry consisted solely of a limited patting of
the outer clothing of the suspect for concealed objects which might be used as
instruments of assault. Only when he discovered such objects did the officer in
Terry place his hands in the pockets of the men he searched. In this case, with
no attempt at an initial limited exploration for arms, [the officer] thrust his hand
into Sibron's pocket and took from him envelopes of heroin . . . . Such a search
violates the . . . Fourth Amendment . ...
Id. at 65. It appears, therefore, that in Sibron, the officer's hands were never lawfully on the
touching area, and consequently that search is not only invalid from a Terry standpoint but
would also be invalid under the proposed plain touch formulation.
But see Comment, The Case against a Plain Feel Exception to the Warrant Require-
ment, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 683, 700 (1987), in which one commentator strains reason by con-
cluding, "In the presence of a plain feel rule . . . Sibron would have lost his suppression
argument."
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justified under a Terry analysis. There remains the possibility
that the feel of the object, together with other suspicious cir-
cumstances, will amount to probable cause that the object is
contraband or some other item subject to seizure, in which case
there may be a further search based upon that probable cause. 8'
Arkansas v. Sanders8" represents yet another harbinger of the
plain touch corollary. In Sanders, the Court noted:
Not all containers and packages found by police during the
course of a search will deserve the full protection of the Fourth
Amendment. Thus, some containers (for example a kit of bur-
glar tools or a gun case) by their very nature cannot support any
reasonable expectation of privacy because their contents can be
inferred from their outward appearance. Similarly, in some
cases the contents of a package will be open to "plain view,"
thereby obviating the need for a warrant.8 3
Following the Supreme Court's decision in Sanders, a number of
courts have focused on the above footnote, seasoned it with a Terry
justification, and recognized that the plain view doctrine does indeed
have a plain touch corollary.
In 1981, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, in
United States v. Russell,8 read Sanders as providing "an exception
to the warrant requirement when 'the[] contents [of a container] can
81. W. LAFAVE, supra note 64, § 9.4(c), at 524. But see State v. Rhodes, 788 P.2d 1380
(Okl. Cr. App. 1990), in which the court summarily refused to apply a plain touch rationale to
a Terry set of circumstances. In Rhodes, during the course of a lawful pat-down, the officer
heard a "crinkling sound" as he felt an object in the defendant's pocket. The officer testified
that it sounded like the crinkling of a plastic baggie. He also felt several small, hard, round
objects which he suspected to be contraband. When the officer retrieved the "crinkling" object,
he discovered that it was a small baggie containing "crack" cocaine. Because the officer did
not think that the object was a weapon, the court affirmed the lower court's order of suppres-
sion. Id. at 1381. Significantly, nowhere in the court's opinion did it indicate whether the
officer was an experienced veteran of the police department, or a novice; there was no way of
telling whether the officer had ever felt similar objects in prior cases which in fact turned out
to be packets of narcotics. Nor did the court address whether this officer received any addi-
tional in-service training with respect to the detection and recognition of controlled dangerous
substances. Consequently, there was not a scintilla of foundational evidence from which the
court might have concluded that the officer had a reasonable basis to conclude that the object
that he was touching was a package of narcotics. In a strongly worded and well-documented
dissent, Judge Lumpkin declared,
I cannot agree with the rationale that a police officer who is legally conducting a
Terry search and discovers illegal contraband must disregard that contraband
just because it is not a weapon. This interpretation completely disregards the
"plain view (touch)" and "exigent circumstance" exceptions to the search war-
rant requirement.
Id. (Lumpkin, J., dissenting).
82. 442 U.S. 753 (1979).
83. Id. at 764-65 n.13 (emphasis added).
84. 655 F.2d 1261 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
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be inferred from [its] outward appearance.'"85 In Russell, the
seizure of a 9mm Browning automatic handgun, hidden in a paper
bag underneath the front seat of defendant's automobile,86 was up-
held "because the contents of the package could be inferred the mo-
ment the bag was seized."' 87 In fact, on cross-examination the officer
testified that when he picked up the bag, his hand was actually grab-
bing the barrel of the gun.88 Under these circumstances, the court
found that the officer "unavoidably felt the outline of a gun as he
drew the paper bag out from under the seat. Uncovering what his
sense of touch revealed did not require a warrant."89 Terry princi-
ples came into play when, just prior to the motor vehicle stop, de-
fendant was observed dipping his right shoulder in a way that sug-
gested he was attempting either to reach for something under the
seat or to hide something there.
The same result was reached by the Ninth Circuit in United
States v. Portillo,90 in which, during a vehicle safety inspection, a
deputy sheriff opened the trunk of the defendant's automobile to look
at a faulty tail-light fixture from inside,
supporting his weight on his left hand which he placed on top of
a paper bag in the center of the spare tire hub. He immediately
felt a hard object inside the bag which felt like a handgun. He
opened the bag and found a fully loaded .38 caliber Colt
revolver."'
On cross-examination, the deputy testified that as soon as he "felt
the hard object . . . he 'knew' [it] was a handgun.
'92
Finding the warrantless seizure of the handgun constitutionally
sound, the Portillo court relied on the Sanders footnote"a and ob-
served that "'[n]ot all containers and packages found by police dur-
ing the course of a search will deserve the full protection of the
Fourth Amendment.' "' Although this statement leads to the first-
85. Id. at 1264 (quoting Sanders, 442 U.S. at 764-65 n.13 (brackets in original)). See
also note 96, infra, particularly noting the commentary relating to the party balloon in Texas
v. Brown.
86. The court initially found that the officer was lawfully in the perceiving area. Russell,
655 F.2d at 1263.
87. Id. at 1264.
88. Id.
89. United States v. Russell, 655 F.2d 1261, 1264 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (emphasis added).
90. 633 F.2d 1313 (9th Cir. 1980).
91. Id. at 1315.
92. Id. at 1316.
93. See supra text accompanying note 83.
94. Portillo, 633 F.2d at 1319 (quoting Arkansas v. Sanders, 422 U.S. 753, 764-65 n. 13
(1979)).
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blush conclusion that the court is distinguishing between "worthy"
and "unworthy" containers,9 a distinction denounced two years later
by the Supreme Court in United States v. Ross,96 reading it in con-
text and against the backdrop of the entire case demonstrates that
the court is merely reiterating that some packages "by their very
nature cannot support any reasonable expectation of privacy because
95. See, e.g., United States v. Mackey, 626 F.2d 684, 687 (9th Cir. 1980) ("A paper
bag is among the least private of containers. It is easily torn, it cannot be latched, and, to a
greater extent than most containers, its contents can frequently be discerned merely by holding
or feeling [it]."). Compare Justice Stewart's opinion in Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420
(1981), in which, writing for a plurality, he flatly rejected the proposition that there is a con-
stitutional distinction between searches of luggage and searches of "less worthy" containers,
id. at 425, with Justice Powell's concurring opinion, in which he declared: "The plurality's
approach strains the rationales of our prior cases and imposes substantial burdens on law en-
forcement without vindicating any significant values of privacy." Id. at 429. Justice Powell
wrote the opinion in Sanders. For further examination of Justice Powell's concurrence, see
supra note 62.
96. 456 U.S. 798, 822 (1982). In Ross, the Court concluded that even though a distinc-
tion between "worthy" and "unworthy" containers
perhaps could evolve in a series of cases in which paper. bags, locked trunks,
lunch buckets, and orange crates were placed on one side of the line or the other,
the central purpose of the Fourth Amendment forecloses such a distinction. For
just as the most frail cottage in the kingdom is absolutely entitled to the same
guarantees of privacy as the most majestic mansion, so also may a traveler who
carries a toothbrush and a few articles of clothing in a paper bag or knotted
scarf claim an equal right to conceal his possessions from official inspection as
the sophisticated executive with the locked attache case.
Id. at 822.
But see Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730 (1983), in which the "unworthy container" at issue
was a green, opaque party balloon, observed through the use of a flashlight from an officer's
vantage point outside Brown's lawfully stopped automobile. After asking for Brown's driving
credentials, the officer saw Brown withdraw his right hand from his right pants pocket.
"Caught between the two middle fingers of the hand was an opaque, green party balloon,
knotted about one-half inch from the tip." Id. at 733. The officer ultimately seized the balloon
and felt that it contained "a sort of powdery substance within the tied-off portion." Id. at 734.
Based on the observation of the balloon and the tactile recognition of its contents, coupled with
the observation of plastic vials and loose powder in the passenger compartment of his vehicle,
Brown was placed under arrest. In upholding the seizure of the balloon, the United States
Supreme Court declared that the officer
possessed probable cause to believe that the balloon in Brown's hand contained
an illicit substance. [The officer] testified that he was aware, both from his par-
ticipation in previous narcotics arrests and from discussions with other officers,
that balloons tied in the manner of the one possessed by Brown were frequently
used to carry narcotics . . . . The fact that [the officer] could not see through
the opaque fabric of the balloon is all but irrelevant; the distinctive character
of the balloon itself spoke volumes as to its contents-particularly to the
trained eye of the officer.
Id. at 742-43 (emphasis added). This rationale leads to the inescapable conclusion that there
are a group of containers in existence-e.g., filled opaque balloons-which may be less worthy
than others. Cf. United States v. Morgan, 744 F.2d 1215, 1222 (6th Cir. 1984) (upholding the
warrantless opening of containers bearing labels identifying their contents); State v. Schrier,
283 N.W.2d 338 (Iowa 1979) (upholding the warrantless opening of transparent containers);
Commonwealth v. Irwin, 391 Mass. 765, 463 N.E. 2d 1178 (1984) (warrantless seizure of
marijuana upheld because officer could detect marijuana's color and shape pressing against the
surface of its container).
95 DiCKINSoN LAW REVIEW SPRING 1991
their contents can be inferred from their outward appearance, '"' and
in this case, through tactile recognition. This reading is consistent
with the Court's observation in Ross that if the worthy versus un-
worthy container distinction is
based on the proposition that the Fourth Amendment protects
only those containers that objectively manifest an individual's
reasonable expectation of privacy, however, the propriety of a
warrantless search necessarily would turn on much more than
the fabric of the container. A paper bag stapled shut and
marked "private" might be found to manifest a reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy, as could a cardboard box stacked on top of
two pieces of heavy luggage. The propriety of the warrantless
search seemingly would turn on an objective appraisal of all
the surrounding circumstances.98
The Portillo court's objective appraisal of all the surrounding cir-
cumstances therefore led to the conclusion that the deputy's initial
inadvertent contact with the paper bag shielding the revolver justi-
fied his seizing the gun because the scope of the seizure was confined
to "an 'intrusion reasonably designed to discover guns, knives, clubs,
or other hidden instruments for the assault of the police officer.' "99
Accordingly, because the Fourth Amendment only provides pro-
tection to the owner of a container that "conceals its contents from
plain view," 100 it is clear that the Russell and Portillo courts
reached the correct result. The officer in each case was lawfully in
the touching area because each arrived at the place from which the
evidence could be tactilely perceived without violating the Fourth
Amendment.101  Additionally, the circumstances in each case
97. See supra text accompanying notes 82 and 83.
98. See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 822 n.30 (1982) (emphasis added).
99. United States v. Portillo, 633 F.2d 1313, 1320 (9th Cir. 1980) (quoting Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 29 (1960)).
100. Ross, 456 U.S. at 822-23 (emphasis added).
101. In Russell, prior to the touching of the paper bag containing the gun, a constitu-
tional motor vehicle stop had been effected. Before the vehicle came to a complete stop, one of
the officers observed Russell dipping his right shoulder in a way that suggested he was at-
tempting either to hide something under the seat or grab something from that location. As
Russell opened the glove box to retrieve his driving credentials, the officer observed what he
believed to be clear plastic packets of heroin and a brown, change-type bag which, based on
the officer's experience, was of the type commonly used to carry marijuana. United States v.
Russell, 655 F.2d 1261, 1262 (D.C. Cir. 1981). As the officer reached in to seize the narcotics,
Russell attempted to close the glove box while ordering the officer to "back off." Id. Russell
then grabbed the packets of suspected heroin. The court concluded that these circumstances
gave the officer "probable cause to believe that drugs were in the car and, therefore, [probable
cause] to search the car without a warrant." Id. at 1263. In view of the pre-Ross posture of
this case, the court proceeded to apply a "plain touch" approach to justify the warrantless
seizure of the gun. Id. at 1264.
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presented an independent constitutional justification for the touching
of the respective items, which is to say, each officer's hand was law-
fully on the touching area. 10 Finally, contemporaneous with the
touching, each officer garnered probable cause to believe that the
item tactilely perceived was a firearm, an item not only subject to
official seizure, 08 but also one which provided these officers with an
objectively reasonable basis to fear for their safety. 04
In 1987, relying in part on the Sanders footnote, the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia expressly adopted what it
called the "plain touch analogue,"' 05 or the "plain touch excep-
tion."' 06 The court declared, in United States v. Williams,07 that
plain view principles establish that "no reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy attaches to containers whose contents are readily discernible
through the use of some sense other than sight."' 08 The Sanders
footnote, according to the Williams court, created a " 'distinction be-
tween containers that proclaim their contents . . . and those that do
not.' "019 "In this sense," stated the court,
the footnote can be best understood as a specific application of a
well-established principle of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence:
apprehension of that which is already in plain view [by] an of-
ficer lawfully present at his vantage point does not infringe any
reasonable expectation of privacy, and its exposure thus is not a
search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment." 0
In Portillo, the police stopped defendant because the vehicle in which defendant was a
passenger had a disfunctional rear brake light and because the license plate registration tags
had expired. Under the authority of California Vehicle Code Section 2806 (authorizing the
warrantless inspection of vehicles having unsafe equipment), one of the officers opened the
trunk to look at the brake light fixture from the inside. This inspection, according to the court,
was justified under the statute. 633 F.2d at 1319. While supporting his weight on his left hand,
which he placed on top of a paper bag in the center of the spare tire hub, the officer immedi-
ately felt the handgun inside. According to the officer, the paper bag was the "only clean spot
in the trunk" to lean on. Id. at 1316. This "inadvertent contact with the paper bag," according
to the court, did not violate any constitutional provision. Id. at 1320.
102. See generally United States v. Russell, 655 F.2d 1261 (D.C. Cir. 1981); United
States v. Portillo, 633 F.2d 1313 (9th Cir. 1980).
103. In Russell, the officer immediately recognized that the object in the paper bag was
a gun. In fact, he testified that he picked up the bag by the gun's barrel. 655 F.2d at 1264. In
Portillo, the officer testified that the moment he touched the bag, he "knew" it was a handgun.
633 F.2d at 1316.
104. Russell, 655 F.2d at 1264, 1264 n.7; Portillo, 633 F.2d at 1320.
105. United States v. Williams, 822 F.2d 1174, 1183 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
106. Id. at 1184.
107. 822 F.2d 1174 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
108. Id. at 1182.
109. Id. (quoting Kamisar, The "Auto Search" Cases: The Court Does Little to Clarify
the "Labyrinth" of Judicial Uncertainty, in J. CHOPER, Y. KAMISAR & L. TRIBE, THE SU-
PREME COURT: TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS 1980-1981, at 104 (1982)).
110. United States v. Williams, 822 F.2d 1174, 1182 (D.C. Cir. 1987). See also New
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In Williams, four plain-clothes officers observed defendant and
two other individuals seated in a parked automobile. Both defendant
and his front-seat companion were "bent over," apparently concen-
trating on something in their laps."' Based on their experience in
investigation of narcotics offenses and the fact that the defendant's
car was parked in an area known for extensive drug usage, the of-
ficers suspected "some kind of narcotics violation.""' 2 As two of the
officers approached the driver's side of the car, they saw defendant
shove a "brown object" or "paper bag" underneath his leg. " '
Berberich and Kass identified themselves as police officers, displayed
their identification, and asked to see defendant's driving credentials.
As defendant searched for his registration, Officer Berberich noticed
that he "kept his legs really closed tight"" 4 in order to hide the bag
underneath.
Fearing that the bag might contain a weapon, Officer Kass
asked defendant to step out of the car. As defendant alighted from
the vehicle, "he put his right hand under his leg and 'attempted to
flip' the bag into the back of the car. The bag hit the driver's seat,
and fell back into the front of the passenger compartment." '" 5 At
that point, Officer Kass reached into the passenger compartment,
picked up the paper bag and felt it with both hands. According to
Kass, when he touched the bag he could "feel that inside were nu-
merous small rolled-up objects" that "felt like plastic baggies.""'
Moreover, on the basis of his experience and training in narcotics
detection, Kass "believed" that inside the paper bag were "numerous
quarter bags of heroin.""' Kass opened the bag and found "five
large baggies with 44 small baggies containing heroin.""' 8 At that
point, defendant was arrested.
In the appeal that followed the denial of his motion to suppress
evidence, defendant argued, among other things, that the removal of
the paper bag from the car was an unconstitutional seizure, and Of-
ficer Kass's treatment of the bag amounted to an unconstitutional
York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 114 (1986) ("[iut is unreasonable to have an expectation of
privacy in an object required by law to be located in a place ordinarily in plain view from the
exterior of [an] automobile").
I11. Williams, 822 F.2d at 1176.
112. Id. (footnotes omitted).
113. Id.
114. Id. at 1177.
115. United States v. Williams, 822 F.2d 1174, 1177 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (footnote
omitted).
116. Id. (footnote omitted).
117. Id.
118. Id.
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search of its contents. 19 The United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, however, did not agree.
Preliminarily, the court determined that the first prong of the
plain view doctrine had been satisfied. Relying on Michigan v.
Long, 20 the Williams court reiterated that whenever an officer who
makes an investigative stop of a suspect in a car has a reasonable
and articulable suspicion that the suspect is dangerous, that officer
may conduct a protective search of all areas of the passenger com-
partment of the vehicle in which a weapon might be concealed.12 1
The court therefore was satisfied that the officers possessed a "rea-
sonable belief based on 'specific and articulable facts which, taken
together with the rational inferences from those facts, reasonably
warrant[ed' their belief that defendant was] dangerous and [could
have gained] immediate control of weapons."'1 22 Thus, the seizure
and "pat down" of the bag, according to the court, was motivated by
a valid concern for Officer Kass's safety and for that of his fellow
officers at the time he took charge of the bag. 2 Consequently, it
appears that the first two prongs of the plain touch formulation had
also been satisfied. Officer Kass was lawfully in the touching area,
and he had an independent constitutional justification for placing his
hands on the item in question.
24
To satisfy the last prong of the plain view doctrine, the Govern-
ment did not contend in Williams that the "very nature" of the pa-
per bag was such that it proclaimed its contents and as a result har-
bored no reasonable expectation of privacy. Instead, the prosecution
focused on the last-quoted sentence of the Sanders footnote and ar-
119. Id. at 1178.
120. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
121. United States v. Williams, 822 F.2d 1174, 1178-79 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (citing Long,
463 U.S. at 1049).
122. Id. at 1179 (quoting Long, 463 U.S. at 1049-50).
123. Id. at 1180.
124. See supra text accompanying notes 56-58. The court in Williams carefully set
forth its requirements for the first two prongs:
First, the "plain touch" exception only applies where an officer is legally author-
ized to touch the container in the first place . . . .As in traditional plain view
situations, if the officers do not lawfully occupy the vantage point from which
their observations are made they cannot rely upon plain touch as justification for
a search.
The requirement of a lawful "vantage point" suggests a corollary limitation:
the doctrine would not sanction any use of the sense of touch beyond that justi-
fied by the initial contact with the container. For example, an officer who satis-
fies himself while conducting a Terry check that no weapon is present in a
container is not free to continue to manipulate it in an attempt to discern the
contents.
822 F.2d at 1184 (footnotes omitted).
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gued that Officer Kass's "lawful touching of the bag rendered its
contents so apparent to him as to bring them into his 'plain
view.' ",125 Relying on this contention, the court therefore phrased
the question: "whether the doctrine recognized in Sanders is applica-
ble if a police officer's knowledge of the contents of a container de-
rives, not from his sense of sight, but from his sense of touch."
' 126
Guided by the decisions that interpret the Sanders footnote, as well
as caselaw that applies the more general principles of plain view,
127
the Williams court held that Officer Kass's seizure of the contraband
was entirely constitutional because "no warrant is needed for the
opening of a container whose contents become known through a law-
ful touching of the outside.
' 12 8
Evaluating the final prong of the doctrine, the court was per-
suaded by the officer's training and experience in the detection and
recognition of controlled dangerous substances, 12 9 as well as his testi-
mony relating the fact that he specifically "had felt drugs packaged
in this fashion on prior occasions."130 Yet the court departed from
the Supreme Court's holding in Arizona v. Hicks,l"' and instead
held that to satisfy the last prong, an officer must have more than
probable cause to believe the contents of the container are associated
with criminal activity. Rather than applying the more familiar (and
now well-settled) Hicks probable-cause-to-associate standard,13 2 the
District of Columbia Circuit required that the lawful touching of an
object must convince the officer "to a reasonable certainty that the
container holds contraband or evidence of crime."1 '' Interestingly,
125. Williams, 822 F.2d at 1182.
126. United States v. Williams, 822 F.2d 1174, 1182 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
127. See id. at 1183-84 nn.90-105 for the court's survey of the cases and commentators
upon which it relied for its decision.
128. Id. at 1184 (emphasis added). See also supra text accompanying notes 109 and
110.
129. Kass was a veteran of the District of Columbia's Park Police Narcotics Unit, and
had patrolled for approximately six years the area where Williams was arrested. Id. at 1176
n.1 I. See also Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730 (1983) ("[wje have recognized that a law en-
forcement officer may rely on his training and experience to draw inferences and make deduc-
tions that might well elude an untrained person"); United States v. Ceballos, 719 F.Supp. 119,
124 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) ("A virtuoso may draw reasonable inferences and suspicions of criminal
involvement that would elude the amateur.").
130. Williams, 822 F.2d at 1177 n.30.
131. 480 U.S. 321 (1987). Hicks, decided five months before Williams, made clear that
probable cause is required for invocation of the plain view doctrine. See Hicks, 480 U.S. at
326-27 (rejecting the Government's contention that the plain view doctrine could be invoked
based on a "reasonable suspicion" standard, and holding that probable cause is the prerequi-
site for a seizure of property located in an officer's plain view).
132. See generally id.; see supra note 51.
133. United States v. Williams, 822 F.2d 1174, 1184 (D.C. Cir. 1987). According to
this part of the court's formulation, a law enforcement officer must have more than probable
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while this Circuit's formal adoption of the plain touch corollary is
consistent with plain-view principles, its heightened standard of be-
lief for the third prong of the formulation seems inappropriately to
place the human senses in a sort of hierarchy of reliability, repre-
senting a grading or ranking of the senses, and a pecking order that
has not received favorable treatment in other courts.134 Nonetheless,
the court did not pause when it concluded that this was "a proper
case for invocation of the plain touch exception." 1 35
cause to believe the contents of a container are associated with some sort of criminal activity.
According to the court, in "plain touch" cases, the information gathered from the lawful
touching of the suspect container must be
good enough to eliminate all need for additional search activity. This can only
occur when sensory information acquired by the officer rises to a state of certi-
tude, rather than mere prediction, in regard to the object of the investigation.
This level of conviction must be objectively reasonable in light of the officer's
past experience and training, and capable of verification by a reviewing court.
Id. at 1185 (footnotes omitted).
134. See, e.g., United States v. Pace, 709 F.Supp. 948, 955 (C.D. Cal. 1989) ("We do
not believe, contrary to Defendant's assertions, that the tactile sense is inherently less reliable
than the sense of sight. When objects have a distinctive and consistent feel and shape that an
officer has been trained to detect and has previous experience in detecting, then touching these
objects provides the officer with the same recognition his sight would have produced."); Hen-
derson v. State, 535 So. 2d 659, 660-61 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (no difference between the
sense of touch and the other senses); People v. Lee, 194 Cal. App. 3d 975, 984, 240 Cal. Rptr.
32, 37 (1987) ("Knowledge gained by a police officer through the sense of touch is as mean-
ingful as knowledge gained through other senses."); People v. Chavers, 33 Cal. 3d 462, 471,
658 P.2d 96, 102, 189 Cal. Rptr. 169, 175 (1983) (same); cf. United States v. Mendenhall,
446 U.S. 544, 563 (1980) ("a trained law enforcement agent may be 'able to perceive and
articulate meaning in given conduct which would be wholly innocent to the untrained ob-
server' "). (Powell, J., concurring) (citation omitted). See also supra note 73. But see Com-
ment, supra note 80, at 703 ("There are fundamental differences between detections by sight
and detections by touch that make plain feel a much weaker candidate for a warrant exception
135. Williams, 822 F.2d at 1185. Here, the court found that sufficient evidence was
present in the record to meet this standard. "Kass testified that he 'could feel' numerous small
rolled-up objects and that he 'believed' that the bag contained numerous quarter bags of her-
oin." Id. at 1186 n.121. When he was asked to explain the basis for the conclusion, Kass
stated, "[Firom feeling it I could tell it was a large amount, small rolled-up objects that felt
like plastic baggies." Id. On the basis of Kass's experience and training, he testified that at the
very moment of touching the bag he concluded that it contained "numerous quarter bags of
heroin." Id. at 1177. Moreover, there was nothing in the record to indicate that Officer Kass
"continued to manipulate the container after it became apparent that no weapon was present
... 11 Id. at I186. Rather, it was apparent that "Kass' handling of the bag left him reasona-
bly certain that contraband was contained therein." Id.
Most recently, the District of Columbia circuit reaffirmed the plain touch principles set
forth in Williams, reiterating that the "plain touch" doctrine represents "a corollary to the
well-established principle that inspection of materials in plain view does not constitute a
search governed by the fourth amendment." United States v. Most, 876 F.2d 191, 194-95
(D.C. Cir. 1989) (emphasis added). In Most, the court emphasized that the use of the plain
touch corollary in Williams was appropriate because Officer Kass's "initial touching of the bag
was justified by his 'well-founded concern for his own safety and that of his fellow officers at
the time he took charge of the bag.' " Most, 876 F.2d at 194. Plain touch was not, however,
available in Most because the officer was not lawfully on the touching area; the officer was not
initially "authorized to feel the bag's exterior." Id. at 195. According to the court,
[tihe initial touching of Most's bag was itself a warrantless search which re-
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A more appropriate formulation of the plain touch corollary was
set forth by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in State v. Washington."3
In Washington, at about 1:20 a.m., officers of the Wauwatosa Police
Department stopped the vehicle in which Washington was a passen-
ger. The vehicle was seen moments earlier leaving the immediate vi-
cinity of a burglarized jewelry store. The officers ordered the occu-
pants of the vehicle out of the car and conducted a pat-down frisk.
"While frisking Washington, [one of the officers] felt three watches
in Washington's pocket."1 7 The officer removed the watches from
Washington's person, discovered that they still had the tags attached
that identified them as the burglarized jewelry store's property, and
immediately placed him under arrest.
188
Although the court implicitly acknowledged that the officer did
not tactilely recognize a weapon during the frisk of Washington, it
nonetheless held that "[t]he watches were discovered in a pat-down
search and therefore [were] properly admissible . "..."139 The court
based this conclusion on a plain view formulation that closely mir-
rors the plain touch corollary advanced by this article. 40 By engraft-
ing the proposed plain-touch formulation onto the Wisconsin court's
plain view analysis, the efficacy of the corollary becomes immedi-
ately apparent.
According to the Washington court, an officer must first "have a
prior justification for being in the position from which the 'plain
view' discovery was made .... ,, " In this respect, the officer must
quired its own justification. Williams provides no support for that touching,
since the factors which supported the initial contact in Williams-the detention
of the suspects and the reasonable fear for the officers' safety-are conspicuously
absent in the present case.
Id. (citation omitted).
136. 134 Wis. 2d 108, 396 N.W.2d 156 (1986).
137. Id. at 114, 396 N.W.2d at 158.
138. It is unclear whether the officer placed Washington under arrest prior to the re-
moval of the watches or after removal. The motion to suppress encompassed an initial hearing,
and then a rehearing at which the officer's testimony differed slightly from the first hearing.
According to the Wisconsin Supreme Court, however, under either version, the seizure of the
watches was valid. Id. at 125, 396 N.W.2d at 163. Interestingly, if the arrest occurred first,
the retrieval of the watches could have been characterized as a search incident to the arrest. If
the officer's tactile recognition of the watches gave him probable cause to believe that they
were the proceeds of the jewelry store burglary, then it logically follows that the officer also
had probable cause to believe, at a minimum, that Washington was committing a crime in the
officer's presence, that is, possession of stolen property. At that point, the officer would have
been authorized, under United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 423-24 (1976), and its prog-
eny, to effect Washington's arrest without a warrant. And of course, incident to that arrest, the
officer could have conducted a search of the suspect. See supra note 10 and accompanying
text.
139. Washington, 134 Wis. 2d at 124, 396 N.W.2d at 163.
140. See supra text accompanying notes 57-62.
141. State v. Washington, 134 Wis. 2d 108, 121, 396 N.W.2d 156, 161 (1986).
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be lawfully in the touching area, and the court found in fact that the
officer was justified in patting down Washington. The court held that
[w]hen a police officer believes that a suspect he has stopped
may be armed and dangerous, the officer "is entitled for the pro-
tection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully
limited search of the outer clothing of [the suspect] in an at-
tempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault
him."142
The court also held that the evidence must be in "plain view of
the discovering officer."' 43 Just as an officer may not move an item
of property to bring something within his or her view,""' so too must
the officer's hands be lawfully on the touching area. In Washington,
the officer's hands were in the process of a valid pat-down frisk when
he touched the watches."'" According to the court,
[e]vidence in plain view is not restricted to items which can only
be seen, but rather includes the realization of items or events to
all of the human senses, smell, sight, touch, hearing and taste.
Because [the officer] felt the three watches by his sense of touch,
he was able to determine what they were and as such, they were
in "plain view." 146
Finally, 14 the lawful touching of the item itself must either di-
rectly, or under the totality of circumstances known to the officer at
the time of the touching, provide probable cause to believe that there
is a connection between the item and criminal activity. 18 This prong
was satisfied in Washington by the tactile recognition of the watches
coupled with the fact that the officer knew about the burglary of the
jewelry store and the defendant's proximity thereto."49 Concluding
that the officer's actions in Washington were clearly authorized by
the plain view doctrine, the Wisconsin court declared: "Though a
142. Id. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968) (citation omitted)).
143. Id.
144. See supra note 58.
145. Washington, 134 Wis. 2d at 121, 396 N.W.2d at 161.
146. State v. Washington, 134 Wis. 2d 108, 122, 396 N.W.2d 156, 161-62 (1986).
147. The court also required that the discovery of the evidence be "inadvertent." id. at
121, 396 N.W.2d at 161. The continued vitality of this requirement, in light of the United
States Supreme Court's recent ruling in Horton v. California, I10 S. Ct. 2301 (1990), is
questionable.
148. Washington, 134 Wis. 2d at 121, 396 N.W.2d at 161.
149. Id. at 123, 396 N.W. 2d at 162. Cf. State v. Ludtke, 306 N.W.2d II, 113 (Minn.
1981) (although "the plastic bag of powder was soft and presumably did not feel like a
weapon," removal was proper for the officer already had lawfully determined that another
similar bag taken from defendant contained marijuana "and therefore could assume that this
packet which he had felt also contained drugs").
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pat-down provides no justification to search for evidence of a crime,
it does not mean that the police must ignore evidence of a crime
which is inadvertently discovered."' 150
Interestingly, the Second Circuit reached a similar result six
years earlier in United States v. Ocampo.'5" In Ocampo, the court
determined that when touching a paper bag permits an officer to
readily identify its contents as "wrapped currency," "no expectation
of privacy, judged by objective and reasonable standards, ex-
ist[s]."' 52 In this respect, the court further held that:
Where the contents of a container are easily discernible by frisk-
ing the exterior of a package, there is little likelihood that the
owner could reasonably expect any substantial degree of privacy.
Under such circumstances it would be a pointless formality to
require that the agents first obtain a warrant before examining
the contents. Accordingly, we hold that the bag's contents could
be examined under what amounts to a "plain feel" version of the
"plain view" doctrine. 53
Most recently, the United States District Court for the Central
District of California, relying heavily on the cases discussed above,""
determined that "'plain view' principles encompass 'plain
touch.' "'55 In United States v. Pace,'56 after surveying and analyz-
ing the evolution of the plain view doctrine through other senses such
as smell 57 and hearing,1 58 the court fashioned a plain touch formula-
tion that most closely resembles the one proposed by this article.' 59
In Pace, defendant moved to suppress two bricks of cocaine that
were seized from his person at the Los Angeles International Airport
by Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) Agents. Preliminarily,
the court determined that the agents lawfully approached defendant
and received defendant's valid consent for a protective pat-down of
his person. 60 One of the agents then "conducted the pat down and
felt two hard objects on [d]efendant's back. He immediately identi-
fied these objects through the [d]efendant's clothing as having the
150. Washington, 134 Wis. 2d at 123, 696 N.W.2d at 162. See also supra note 63, text
accompanying note 81.
151. 650 F.2d 421 (2d Cir. 1981).
152. Id. at 429.
153. Id.
154. See supra notes 72, 73, 82, 84, 90, 107, 151 and accompanying text.
155. United States v. Pace, 709 F. Supp. 948, 954 (C.D. Cal. 1989).
156. 709 F. Supp. 948 (C.D. Cal. 1989).
157. Id. at 954. See also notes 72-73.
158. Pace, 709 F. Supp. at 954. See also note 73.
159. Pace, 709 F. Supp. at 955. See also supra text accompanying notes 57-62.
160. Pace, 709 F. Supp. at 951-52.
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size and shape of two kilos of cocaine packaged in the form of
'bricks' . .. "I" According to the agent's testimony, the tactile rec-
ognition of the objects as bricks of cocaine occurred contemporane-
ously with the touching, and the court credited his testimony relating
that he "immediately identified the bulges according to their size,
shape, hardness and location as bricks of cocaine in kilo size.
' 162
[The agent] then, instantaneously and without warning, lifted
up [d]efendant's ski parka and sweatshirt. He found two brick-
like objects on [d]efendant's back, concealed under a blue rub-
ber elastic stomach support. He immediately recognized the ob-
jects he saw as cocaine by virtue of their size, shape, color, and
packaging. 16'
This set of circumstances, the court held, clearly comes within
the plain touch corollary to the plain view exception,164 and as a re-
sult, the DEA agent was justified in seizing the cocaine bricks
strapped to defendant's back.1
6
1
The court's formulation of its "plain touch analogue" began
with the rejection of Pace's contention that "the tactile sense is in-
herently less reliable than the sense of sight."'16 6 In this regard, the
court responded: "When objects have a distinctive and consistent feel
and shape that an officer has been trained to detect and has previous
experience in detecting, then touching these objects provides the of-
ficer with the same recognition his sight would have produced."' 67
The court then proceeded to analyze the propriety of the agent's ac-
tions by reference to a set of three criteria-the three prongs of its
plain touch analogue.
First, the officer must be lawfully in the touching area. Relevant
in this regard is the general rule that law enforcement officers do not
violate the Fourth Amendment merely by approaching an individual
in a public place, or by asking him if he is willing to answer some
questions. 8 Thus, the DEA agents' noncoercive approach of Pace at
the Los Angeles International Airport brought them lawfully within
the touching area.
The second prong of the Pace formulation requires that the of-
161. United States v. Pace, 709 F. Supp. 948, 951 (C.D. Cal. 1989).
162. Id. at 956.
163. Id. at 951.
164. Id. at 956.
165. Id.
166. United States v. Pace, 709 F. Supp. 948, 955 (C.D. Cal. 1989).
167. Id.
168. Id. at 951 (citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497 (1982)).
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ficer have some independent legal justification to touch the individ-
ual. 69 In Pace, this requirement was met when the agents received
defendant's voluntary consent to conduct a protective pat down. "
The court's final prong requires a finding that the officer's law-
ful touching provide him with probable cause to believe that the
container holds contraband or evidence of a crime.' This prong also
requires an independent determination whether the officer's probable
cause assessment was "objectively reasonable.' ' 7 2 Although the Pace
court substantially agrees with the Williams court conclusion 73 that
the plain touch exception must be limited to cases "where the officer
is lawfully authorized to touch the container and where knowledge of
the container's contents is coincidental with the lawful touching,"'
7 4
Pace rejects the "reasonable certainty" standard, 5 and holds that
"the probable cause standard, rather than any higher degree of certi-
tude, is appropriate when an officer can demonstrate that he was
objectively reasonable in concluding that the container holds contra-
band or evidence of crime.""16 In this respect, the Pace court further
held that "[i]f an officer acts in an objectively reasonable manner,
acting the way in which a reasonable, experienced and trained officer
would perform under the circumstances, we believe that the probable
cause standard sufficiently safeguards individuals' Fourth Amend-
ment rights.'"
7
As a result, the Pace court held that the final prong of the Pace
plain touch analogue was satisfied in several respects. First, the court
found the agent's testimony persuasive in that "he did not merely
feel two nondescript bulges on defendant's back, but immediately
identified the bulges according to size, shape, hardness and location
as bricks of cocaine in kilo size."' 78 Additionally, the court found the
agent's tactile recognition of the bricks of cocaine to be objectively
reasonable by virtue of the agent's training and experience in the
detection and recognition of controlled dangerous substances.'79 The
169. Id. at 956.
170. Id. at 952-53.
171. United States v. Pace, 709 F. Supp. 948, 955 n.3 (C.D. Cal. 1989).
172. Id. at 956.
173. See supra text accompanying notes 123-24.
174. Pace, 709 F. Supp. at 955 n.3.
175. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
176. United States v. Pace, 709 F. Supp. 948, 955 n.3 (C.D. Cal. 1989).
177. Id. (emphasis added).
178. Id. at 976.
179. See id. This particular agent's experience included twenty-five years as a Los An-
geles police officer, three and one-half years of working at the Los Angeles International Air-
port, over 1,000 narcotics trafficking, investigations and numerous drug courier arrests. Id.
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agent's testimony regarding previous occasions similar to the instant
one was significant. The agent, in the course of prior pat-down
searches, felt objects on suspects' backs "which approximated the
same size, shape, hardness and location as the objects felt on
[Pace's] back." In each of those cases, the objects revealed were
kilo-size bricks of cocaine. 180
Moreover, the court found that the agent's tactile recognition of
the cocaine bricks occurred at the moment of touching; recognition
was coincidental with a lawful pat down.181 Consequently, all of
these factors led the court to conclude that the agent's plain touch
clearly provided him with probable cause to believe that the objects
were contraband, or were associated with criminal activity, and
therefore the agent had the concomitant authority to effect a war-
rantless seizure.1
82
During the course of its opinion, the Pace court made a critical
observation on the basis of a persuasive courtroom demonstration,
which took place during the hearing on Pace's motion to suppress
evidence. At the suppression hearing, the court allowed the prosecu-
tion to bring in the actual cocaine bricks for the judge to touch dur-
ing a "re-enactment" of Pace's pat-down frisk. After the demonstra-
tion, the court was convinced "that the nature, size, shape and
location of the bricks [were] such that a reasonable detective with
[this agent's] past experience and training would have concluded,
through touching them during a pat down search, that they were in
fact kilogram containers of contraband."' 83 Reflecting upon the dem-
onstration, the court appropriately observed that
unlike the evanescent and fleeting nature of odors which has
posed problems for reviewing courts trying to decide whether a
'plain smell' exception applies, . . .tactile information can be
preserved for trial to assure courts of an opportunity to evaluate
the objects the officer claims to have triggered his sense of
180. Id.
181. United States v. Pace, 709 F. Supp. 948, 976 (C.D. Cal. 1989).
182. Id. at 955-56. Although the court rejected the Williams "reasonable certainty"
standard, see supra notes 173-75 and accompanying text, it nonetheless opined, "Even were
the Court to apply the Williams 'reasonable certainty' standard, however, we would find that
[the agent's] touching of the objects on [dlefendant's back convinced him to a reasonable
certainty that they were kilogram containers of cocaine." Pace, 709 F. Supp. at 955 n.3. The
court also found the seizure of the cocaine bricks valid under a search incident to arrest the-
ory, The probable cause garnered from all the surrounding circumstances coupled with the
lawful plain touch provided the agent with the authority to arrest Pace, with the seizure of the
bricks occurring as a contemporaneous and lawful incident thereto. See id. at 956-57. See also
supra note 138.
183. Pace, 709 F. Supp. at 956.
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touch.1 8 4
C. Adopting the Formulation
Perhaps the touchstone of any decision to adopt the plain touch
corollary lies in the underlying significance of the last words quoted
from the Wisconsin court's opinion in Washington, repeated here for
convenience: "Though a pat-down provides no justification to search
for evidence of a crime, it does not mean that the police must ignore
evidence of a crime which is inadvertently discovered. 18 5
Once an officer who is lawfully in and on the touching area tac-
tilely perceives what he or she immediately recognizes as contraband
or other evidence of crime, it would be disingenuous to require the
officer either to ignore the probability that a crime is being commit-
ted in his presence186 and let the suspect go, or to prolong the sus-
pect's detention for the hours it might take to apply for and obtain a
search warrant. In the context of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence,
a proper but realistic balance must be struck between a citizen's rea-
sonable expectation of privacy and freedom from unreasonable gov-
ernmental interference, and the competing demands of effective law
enforcement.
We have witnessed, in recent years, a demonstrable increase in
law enforcement efforts to detect and curb the devastating practice
of drug trafficking. Complicating the difficulty of detection is the
fact that the prosecution of drug offenses depends heavily on physi-
cal evidence.18 7 Although the drug industry's profits are immense,
the packaging of its product is small and may be easily concealed.
"As a result, the obstacles to detection of illegal conduct may be
unmatched in any other area of law enforcement."188 One need only
examine the past decade's reported decisions in the area of search
and seizure for a prognosis of the narcotic cancer that eats away at
the very heart of this Nation's families. It is not very encouraging.
The discussion thus far implicitly suggests that in the vast ma-
jority of cases the sine qua non of the plain touch corollary is the
184. Id. (citations omitted). See also United States v. Williams, 822 F.2d 1174, 1185
(D.C. Cir. 1987) (the officer's belief "must be objectively reasonable in light of the officer's
past experience and training, and capable of verification by a reviewing court") (footnote
omitted).
185. State v. Washington, 134 Wis. 2d 108, 123, 396 N.W.2d 156, 162 (1986).
186. See id.
187. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907 n.6 (1984).
188. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 561-62 (1980). See also Florida v.
Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 519 (1982) ("The special need for flexibility in uncovering illicit drug
couriers is hardly debatable.") (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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Terry pat-down frisk, and the sensible realization that additional
facts do indeed come to light during the course of the frisk. Interest-
ingly, Terry itself stands for the proposition that the frisk may dis-
close additional information that will suffice to create probable cause
for a further intrusion.'89 Therefore, if by touch an officer recognizes
a weapon during the course of a lawful pat down, he or she is per-
mitted to conduct an additional-though carefully limited-search
designed to uncover the suspected weapon. In this set of circum-
stances one may conclude that the tactile recognition of the con-
cealed weapon brought the weapon within the officer's "plain view."
Thus, the subsequent seizure would result in no additional invasion
of privacy. A similar conclusion may be drawn when, during the
course of a lawful pat down, a seasoned officer's plain touch provides
probable-cause to believe that the suspect possesses an item of con-
traband or other evidence of crime. Yet, since Terry, the cases have
consistently emphasized that "[t]he purpose of this limited search is
not to discover evidence of crime, but to allow the officer to pursue
his investigation without fear of violence."'9 0 What Terry's progeny
fail to adequately address, however, are the evidentiary discoveries
that so often arise as a natural and foreseeable consequence of the
typical pat-down frisk; such a consequence is precipitated by a
trained and experienced plain touch. It is here that the scales must
tip in favor of the significant, modern-day law enforcement interests
at stake.
The modern-day law officer's training and experience-the en-
forcement profession's study and practice-must inevitably, if not in-
variably, factor into a court's decision to adopt the plain touch
corollary.
As law enforcement officials' knowledge of the narcotics indus-
try expands and the tools and techniques of the trade shift, the
indicia of suspicion and degree of import attached to each will
also change. Those indicia must be evaluated "not in terms of
library analysis by scholars, but as understood by those versed in
189. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I, 29 (1960), in which the Court held that the "frisk"
set of circumstances includes not only the authority to conduct a protective pat down of a
suspect's outer clothing, but in addition, contemplates the further intrusion of reaching into the
suspect's clothing-"an intrusion reasonably designed to discover guns, knives, clubs, or other
hidden instruments for the assault of the police officer." See also Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S.
1032 (1983).
190. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972). See also Ybarra v. Illinois, 444
U.S. 85, 93-94 (1979) ("Nothing in Terry can be understood to allow [a] search . . . for
anything but weapons.").
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the field of law enforcement."1 91
As the indicia of suspicion elevate into the constitutional mandate of
probable cause, it should not matter whether such cause is garnered
from an officer's sense of touch or derives from his or her sense of
sight. If the standard is probable cause, and if such cause is found to
exist, the warrantless seizure of the evidentiary item in these circum-
stances is a reasonable intrusion, and it matters not that it flows
from an officer's plain view or that doctrine's natural corollary,
"plain touch."
IV. Conclusion
As this article has demonstrated, several courts have struck an
appropriate and realistic balance by formulating and adopting, in
one form or another, a plain touch corollary to the plain view doc-
trine. In Pace, the Central District of California set forth a formula-
tion most consistent with the Fourth Amendment principles apper-
taining to the plain view doctrine. That formulation, which most
closely mirrors the corollary advanced herein, presents not only a
workable and familiar standard for law enforcement but it also re-
spects the highly significant Fourth Amendment liberty interests that
are at stake. The same appropriate balance was struck by the Sec-
ond Circuit in Ocampo and the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Wash-
ington. In Russell and Williams, the District of Columbia Circuit
has also adopted a plain touch corollary. Though this Circuit re-
quires a degree of certainty in the tactile recognition, it nonetheless
has demonstrated its willingness to accept, as did the Ninth Circuit
in Portillo, the proposition that the plain view doctrine includes, in
the appropriate case, plain touch. Significantly, several other courts
have followed, or appear ready to follow suit. 192
191. United States v. Ceballos, 719 F. Supp. 119, 123 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) (quoting United
States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 419 (1981)).
192. See, e.g., United States v. Buchannon, 878 F.2d 1065, 1067 (8th Cir. 1989) (even
"if this was not a 'plain view' case it may be called a 'plain feel' case"); Ceballos, 719 F.
Supp. at 127 (holding that "evidence revealed by touch in the course of a frisk is admissible
under ... the 'plain feel' version of the 'plain view' doctrine, if the 'feel' was proper"); see
also id. at 128 ("The tactile discovery during the pat-down revealed evidence of the crime
suspected and transformed the agent's reasonable suspicion into probable cause to arrest. "The
feel of the object, together with the pattern of defendant['s] behavior observed earlier,
amounted to probable cause to believe the object was narcotics and that the defendant[] had
committed a narcotics offense."); People v. Chavers, 33 Cal. 3d 462, 471, 658 P.2d 96, 102,
189 Cal. Rptr. 169, 175 (1983) (knowledge gained through sense of touch is as "meaningful
and accurate as if the container had been transparent"); People v. Lee, 194 Cal. App. 3d 975,
985, 240 Cal. Rptr. 32, 38 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987) (plain touch of heroin-filled balloons recog-
nized during the course of a lawful pat down held to' constitute probable cause for their seizure
when officer identified the objects as contraband "simultaneously with the elimination of the
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Whether our hypothetical Officer Cooper1 93 may constitution-
ally reach into the suspect's pocket and seize the object he tactilely
recognizes as contraband will depend on whether the courts in his
jurisdiction will strike an appropriate balance between the relevant
competing interests and ultimately accept the plain touch corollary
as a natural and foreseeable consequence of the plain view doctrine.
possibility of a weapon," and when the officer testified that he had recognized the object from
his experience on at least 100 prior occasions involving similar balloons filled with heroin);
People v. Carlson, 187 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 6, 25, 233 Cal. Rptr. 236, 247 (Cal. App. Dep't
Superior Ct. 1986) (plain touch of hard object in defendant's fanny pack which was situated
around his waist provided probable cause to unzip the pack; discovery of gun then gave rise to
probable cause to arrest); State v. Ortiz, 4 Haw. App. 143, 162, 662 P.2d 517, 531 (1983)
(Haw. Ct. App. 1983) ("[u]nder the plain feel rule, where a government agent's feeling of the
outside of a container is justified and weapons, contraband, or evidence of crime are then
immediately, coincidentally, and definitely discerned, a government agent may open the
container to remove such items") (footnote omitted), vacated on this issue, affid on other
grounds, 67 Haw. 181, 184, 683 P.2d 822, 825 (1984) (applying a Terry standard exclu-
sively); Jordan v. State, 72 Md. App. 528, 540, 531 A.2d 1028, 1034 (1987) (tactile recogni-
tion of hard object during lawful pat down of bag that suspect was holding is permitted, rea-
soning that the additional "de minimis intrusion" of opening the bag to determine if the object
was a gun was "reasonable"). See also United States v. Most, 876 F.2d 191 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
(District of Columbia circuit reaffirming the plain touch principles set forth in Williams, and
reiterating that the "plain touch" doctrine represents "a corollary to the well-established prin-
ciple that inspection of materials in plain view does not constitute a search governed by the
fourth amendment") (emphasis added).
193. Referring to the hypothetical set forth immediately before the Introduction.

